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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v 




Defendant responds to the State's arguments in its brief, and contends that the 
police officer lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest and that his counsel 
ineffectively failed to move to suppress the evidence as required. 
I. THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT 
The State claims that the probable cause standard was met. However, the 
officer's conduct did not fit within the law defining probable cause. Secondly, the 
additional facts mentioned by the State still would not have provided the officer with 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Penick. Consequently, defense counsel remained 
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence. 
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a. The Standard for Probable Cause 
The State claims, citing one authority, that the police officer had probable cause 
to arrest Mr. Penick because a "fair probability" existed that Mr. Penick was the 
suspect. Aple's Br. at 13,15-16, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
The "fair probability" standard does not apply in situations in which probable 
cause to arrest is needed. Gates involved an anonymous tip that a person was dealing 
drugs. Id. at 213. The Supreme Court held that magistrates were not restricted to a 
two-prong test for evaluating probable cause to search, but instead, they required 
magistrates to apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine if "there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
Id. at 238. The Court cautioned using mere statements in an affidavit as a basis to 
support the issuance of a warrant, stating that a witness's or officer's sworn statement 
"will not do." Id. at 239. Rather, according to the Court, the affidavit must give a 
magistrate "a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." Id. To 
that end, the Court emphasized that it has "consistently recognized the value of 
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work" and that 
"bare bones" affidavits did not rise to the level of probable cause. Id. at 239,241. 
Gates does not create a "fair probability" test. Rather, it merely articulates that 
in cases involving tips from an anonymous witness, magistrates must determine the 
existence of probable cause based on the totality of circumstances. The Court took 
2 
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great care to emphasize that a magistrate must have a "substantial basis" to conclude 
that probable cause exists and that officers must exercise great care to corroborate an 
informant's tip. Id. at 239-41. 
Probable cause, at detailed in Mr. Penick's opening brief, see Aplt's Br. at 19, 
requires an objective basis to believe that a particular person has committed an 
offense. The Supreme Court "repeatedly has explained that 'probable cause' to justify 
an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in 
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 
L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). In other words, the standard essentially requires the police to 
have facts from which one could reasonably, and objectively, conclude that this 
particular person committed the offense at hand. Thus, the standard is not one of "fair 
probability," but of an objectively reasonable determination, using the totality of the 
circumstances, that the suspect committed the offense. 
b. The Defendant Presented an Adequate Record of the Lack of Probable 
Cause in this Case 
The State also contends that Mr. Penick failed to consider five specific facts 
which it asserts strengthens its position. First, the defendant "locked eyes" with the 
officer after averting his eyes. Aple's Br. at 16-17. Second, the detective stated that Mr. 
3 
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Penick was wearing the same pants as the black suspect from the video. Aple's Br. at 
17. Third, Detective Coats used still shots from the surveillance video in making his 
identification. Aple's Br. at 18. Fourth, the anonymous tipster provided "both a name 
and an address" of the suspects. Aple's Br., at 18. Finally, the detective spoke with the 
VOA director prior to arresting Mr. Penick. Aple's Br. at 18-19. Taken together, the 
State contends, the Court may make several key assumptions from which it must 
conclude that counsel's actions were the product of sound trial strategy. Aple's Br. at 
19-20. 
Mr. Penick will address each of these five facts in turn before examining the 
cumulative effect of these facts on defense counsel's actions. 
The defendant's "locked eyes" do nothing to establish the existence of probable 
cause. The officer testified that Mr. Penick "then approached me, he came back, 
locked eyes with me and walked up to me asking me why I was there, if I was going to 
help with donations for the VOA and what was I investigating." R. 211:24. If someone 
intends to talk with another person, the abnormal response would be to avoid eye 
contact. The normal response would be to make eye contact. The State cites an 
unpublished decision, which only references "unusual conduct" of a defendant as 
indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Looking someone in the eyes when speaking to 
him is not an unusual response, nor does it evince a consciousness of guilt. Defendant 
has been unable to find a single reported case in which "locked eyes" were indicative 
4 
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of guilt. By extension, if the avoidance of eye contact does not support a determination 
of probable cause, then the maintenance of eye contact would also not support that 
determination since it, too, is "consistent with innocent" behavior. See State v. 
Duhaime, 2011 UT App 209, f 18, 258 P.3d 649,657 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431,436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
The detective testified while reviewing the video tape that "the pants that 
[Penick's] wearing are the pants that he had on the clay that I interviewed him." R. 
211:74. There are several problems with this identification. First, the officer testified 
that the colors were better on the computer. Id. In fact, he said that "[t]his video on 
this screen right here is not a very good representation because in this video it looks 
either a blue-grey or a blue." Id. The officer's only specific testimony about the pants 
were that they were "grey pants." R. 211:18. He did not identify any distinguishing 
characteristics that made them unique. Grey pants are a very common item and 
nothing in the officer's testimony tends toward the conclusion that these pants had 
any qualities that made them unique to the defendant. In fact, the officer did not see 
Mr. Penick until two days after the crime. R. 211:77. Because the detective cannot 
account for the passage of time between those two days, he cannot conclude that Mr. 
Penick was the same person in the video based off of the pants alone. The pants worn 
have little or nothing to do with a probable cause determination—no less an 
identification—considering that multiple days passed between the viewing of the 
5 
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video and the defendant's arrest. Defendant could have received those pants from the 
perpetrator or the shelter, for example. 
The fact that the officer used video surveillance footage and circulated it to the 
news media was referenced repeatedly in the defendant's brief. See Aplt's Br. at 20-21, 
23. The fact that there were other still shots in the record of the same footage does not 
change the analysis in any significant way since defendant already addressed the 
impact of the surveillance footage. The officer still needed to confirm with the witness, 
Mr. Magack, that the person in the surveillance footage and the person he was talking 
to at the VOA, Jeremy Penick, were one and the same. This could have been done by a 
simple lineup procedure. 
The defendant acknowledged that the anonymous tipster gave the officer a 
name and that the person was possibly staying at the VOA shelter. Aplt's Br. at 21. He 
also acknowledged that the officer spoke with the director. Id. The State contends that 
this Court can assume from these facts that: 1) the anonymous tipster gave the name 
of Jeremy Penick, 2) that the officer identified the person he was speaking with as 
Jeremy Penick in his conversation with the director, and 3) that defense counsel knew 
all of these facts. Aple's Br. at 18-19. In fact, the State acknowledges that "the record 
presented does not include any evidence on these matters" but that because defendant 
failed to present evidence of these conclusions, this Court must assume that counsel 
performed effectively. Aple's Br. at 19. 
6 
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The State claims that "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must 
assume that trial counsel 'knew of materials outside the record'..." Aple's Br. at 19, 
quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788,178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (emphasis 
added). However, the full quotation from Richter does not support the State's 
interpretation of that language. 
Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is 
a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with 
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge. It is "all too tempting" to 
"second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence." 
Id. The Court does not say that courts are to presume defense counsel knew of facts 
beyond the record—it only says that courts should defer to counsel's representation. 
Richter does not mandate the imputation of knowledge; it only addresses the standard 
of deference. 
While the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an adequate record, see 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, the key issue is whether trial counsel 
should have moved to suppress evidence. None of these pieces of evidence, even 
assuming their truth, affects this decision. Assuming the officer was given the name of 
Jeremy Penick by the anonymous tipster and that he spoke with the director of the 
VOA, who told him that Jeremy Penick was a resident there, the officer still could not 
connect Mr. Penick to the crime for purposes of probable cause. 
7 
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Jeremy Penick was clearly a resident of the VOA and the director could have 
confirmed that fact. The detective needed only to corroborate the anonymous tipster's 
information and verify that Mr. Magack believed this individual to be his assailant. 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that the officer asked Mr. Penick his name prior 
to arresting him. Nor did the officer ask Mr. Magack whether Mr. Penick and the 
perpetrator were the same person. Nor did he ask the anonymous tipster how he or 
she knew information about Mr. Penick. 
The proper investigation would have been easy. The officer could ask Mr. 
Penick his name. At that point, he would have corroborated the tip (that a person by 
that name was at the VOA), but he still would not know whether Mr. Penick 
committed the crime in question. To verify and corroborate that fact, he could have 
asked Mr. Penick questions (instead of arresting him). He could have asked him to 
voluntarily come in for questioning or for a lineup. The detective could have obtained 
a photograph of Mr. Penick and conducted a lineup with Mr. Magack to ensure that 
Mr. Penick and the suspect were one in the same. 
Under the State's line of reasoning, this Court is to make several key logical 
leaps. First, it must assume that the anonymous tipster gave the name of Jeremy 
Penick. It must also assume that the tipster saw the picture of Jeremy Penick (which 
does not appear to be the case, since the tipster mentioned that two males were talking 
about attacking a taxi driver). R. 211:21. Then the Court must assume that when the 
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detective spoke with the director, she confirmed that the person downstairs was, in 
fact, Jeremy Penick. But, even assuming all of these facts are true, one cannot get over 
the final, critical assumption: this Court must still assume that Jeremy Penick was the 
one who assaulted Mr. Magack. At the stage of arrest, the detective lacked probable 
cause of that fact. 
Mr. Magack had identified the person in the photo as his attacker. The tipster 
potentially said that Jeremy Penick talked about being the attacker. The officer 
potentially discovered that the individual who spoke with him was Jeremy Penick. 
Thus, the officer needed only confirm that Jeremy Penick was the person who 
attacked Mr. Magack and he would have had probable cause to effectuate an arrest. 
Yet, he failed to take further steps to confirm that fact and he arrested Mr. Penick 
without probable cause. 
This failure was critical because defense counsel would have no objective basis 
upon which to fail to move to suppress the evidence. As demonstrated in Mr. Penick's 
opening brief, the motion would have been granted and the result would have been 
different. See Aplt's Br. at 18-30. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Penick asks this Court to find that the officer 
lacked probable cause to arrest him and that his counsel ineffectively failed to move to 
suppress evidence found as a result of that arrest. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22- day of May, 2012. 
P t±e 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
RULE 24 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Pursuant to rule 24(f)(1)(C), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that this 
brief has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced font using Microsoft Word for 
Mac 2011 in Minion Pro 13.5 point, and contains 2202 words, excluding the table of 
contents, table of authorities, and addenda. 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Atrorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no 
addendum is necessary given the arguments made in this brief. 
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